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Abstract. The Berle–Means problem – information and incentive asymmetries
disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors – has
remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the Berle–
Means paradigm – widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched
managers – is under stress in the wake of the cross-country evidence presented by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and their legal approach to corporate
control.
This paper continues to investigate the roles of investor protections and
concentrated ownership by examining firm behaviour in the Netherlands. Our
within-country analysis generates two key results. First, the role of investor
protections emphasized in the legal approach is not sustained. Rather, firm
performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints. Second,
ownership concentration does not have a discernible impact on firm performance,
which may reflect large shareholders’ dual role in lowering the costs of managerial
agency problems but raising the agency costs of expropriation.
JEL classification: G3.
Keywords: Corporate governance; legal approach; the Netherlands.
r Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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But have we any justification for assuming that those in control of a modern
corporation will also choose to operate it in the interests of the owners?
(Berle and Means, 1932, p. 113)
y the stockholders’ position, once a controlling factor in the running of the
enterprise, has declined from extreme strength to practical impotence.
(Berle and Means, 1932, p. 131)
1. INTRODUCTION
The Berle–Means problem – information and incentive asymmetries disrupt-
ing relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors – has
remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the
Berle–Means paradigm – widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong,
entrenched managers – is under stress and of only modest applicability
for most developed countries. In a recent paper, La Porta et al. (LLS, 1999),
examine the 20 largest firms in 27 wealthy countries, and show that
concentrated ownership is the norm, not the exception.1 The Berle–Means
paradigm is appropriate for the United States and United Kingdom, countries
whose legal environments provide very good protection of minority share-
holders’ rights. LLS’s cross-country results emphasize that investor protec-
tions and concentrated ownership are the key elements for understanding
how the modern corporation is controlled and ‘how to assure financiers that
they get a return on their financial investment’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997,
p. 773).2
This paper continues to investigate these two mechanisms of corporate
control by examining the roles of investor protections and concentrated
ownership on firm behaviour in the Netherlands. A within-country analysis
complements the prior cross-country research because several factors – taxes
and regulations – can be held constant. Dutch firms are very useful for
studying these mechanisms of control because several devices exist for
circumscribing investor protections that are used by many, but not all, firms.
Ownership concentration also ranges widely.
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of corporate control
mechanisms on firm performance. Section 2 discusses the system of corporate
control in the Netherlands, and reviews the roles of three key sets of actors:
management and supervisory boards, shareholders and institutions. Financial
statement, anti-investor protection and ownership data are available for 93
1. See Barca and Becht (2001) and Gugler (2001) for further analysis of concentrated
ownership.
2. Roe (1994) presents an alternative and provocative theory of how political forces created a
dispersed structure of corporate ownership in the United States. See Carney (1997) and LLS
(1999, Sec. III) for critiques, and Roe (1999) for further elaboration of his thesis.
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firms for the period 1992 to 1996. Section 3 discusses these data, and
documents the variation in anti-investor protections and concentrated
ownership in the sample. Section 4 discusses the ambiguous effects of anti-
investor protections and concentrated ownership as corporate control
mechanisms on long-run performance (measured by the long-run return on
assets computed as a five-year average) and the appropriateness of focusing
on the cross-section dimension of the data.
Empirical results are contained in the next two sections. Section 5 con-
tains a simple test of the substitution hypothesis between investor protec-
tions and ownership concentration that is an important element in the legal
approach to corporate governance. We find no support for the substitution
hypothesis in our Dutch data. Rather, it seems that once anti-investor
protections are in place, the firm is either avoided or abandoned by
concentrated owners (though alternative interpretations of this simple
correlation exist). Regression results are contained in Section 6. We uncover
a strong positive relation between the absence of investor protections and
profitability. That is, as firms are freed from the pressure of equity markets,
profitability rises. No systematic relation is uncovered for ownership
concentration.
A summary and conclusions are presented in Section 7. In interpreting the
results presented in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that this
evidence is more in the spirit of interesting conditional correlations than
definitive tests about fundamental causes. The current research aims to
stimulate and direct theoretical modelling that will ultimately provide the
basis for more formal hypothesis testing.
2. CORPORATE CONTROL IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch system of corporate control contains three key sets of actors:
management and supervisory boards, shareholders and institutions.3
2.1. Management and supervisory boards
The focal point of the corporate control system is a two-tiered board structure
consisting of a management board (Raad van Bestuur) in charge of the day-to-
day operations of the firm, and a supervisory board (Raad van Commissar-
issen). The supervisory board’s scope of influence varies substantially
depending on which organizational regime the firm adopts. The structural
3. Detailed descriptions of the system of corporate control and finance in the Netherlands can
be found in CPB (1997, Ch. 10), Gelauff and den Broeder (1997), de Jong et al. (2001) and
Kabir et al. (1999). We have relied particularly heavily on Gelauff and den Broeder’s work in
writing this section.
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regime (Structuurregeling) described here applies to the majority of public
limited liability companies (Naamloze Vennootschappen, NVs) listed on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. (The other two regimes – mitigated structural
and common – are discussed in Section 2.2.) The supervisory board has three
primary functions: appoint (usually for an indefinite term), monitor and
dismiss members of the management board (though the latter rarely
occurs);4 draft the annual financial statement for presentation at the annual
shareholders meeting;5 and approve major business decisions proposed by
the management board concerning, for example, expansions, acquisitions,
restructurings or financing.
Members of the supervisory board are appointed for four-year terms by
co-option; that is, by the incumbent members of the supervisory board.6
An individual cannot serve on both the supervisory and management boards
of the same company. In practice, the management board has a very large
influence on appointments to the supervisory board (van der Goot and van
het Kaar, 1997).7 The two-tiered board structure in the Netherlands differs
substantially from that in Germany, where the supervisory board is appointed
by the shareholders at the annual meeting and exerts substantial indepen-
dent influence on management. The close relations between management
and supervisory boards makes the Dutch two-tiered system somewhat similar
to the US system, where executive managers sit on the board of directors
(comparable to the supervisory board) and the chief executive officer often
chairs the board of directors. In sum, the Dutch supervisory board is largely
advisory, though that counsel may receive more attention depending on the
background of the advising member.
2.2. Shareholders
Shareholders/investors exercise control through voting at the annual meeting
(Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders) and, for large investors, by sitting
4. Dutch management board turnover, calculated as the number of management board
members leaving the firm by other than natural causes and scaled by board size, is
approximately 8% (van Oijen, 2000). This figure is somewhat low compared to those
reported for other countries; Kaplan (1994) reports turnover rates of 12% (excluding cases of
death and illness) for the United States and 10% for Germany.
5. The responsibilities for hiring and firing the auditor reside with the supervisory board,
though the management board is consulted frequently about these choices.
6. The mean [median] number of members on the supervisory and management boards for our
sample of firms is 4.95 [5] and 2.95 [3], respectively.
7. Inside (managerial) ownership of listed firms is unimportant in the Netherlands. Based on
an ownership criterion of 5%, 19 of 137 firms were owned by insiders sitting on the
management board and an additional and different 6 firms for those on the supervisory
board (de Jong et al., 2001, Table 11). Majority ownership was achieved by the management
board of 5 firms and by the supervisory board of 1 firm. For the 137 firms, average ownership
is 4.86% and 1.82% for management and supervisory boards, respectively.
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on the supervisory board. At the annual meeting, the influence of investors is
circumscribed under the structural regime in two ways. First, few important
issues come before the annual meeting: the financial statement drafted by
the supervisory board is voted on (amendments are not permitted) and
nominations for the supervisory board may be proposed and rejected (though
election is by incumbent members of the supervisory board). Large investors
can exert influence by refusing to approve the financial statements and
supervisory board nominations.
Second and more devastating to investors’ voting rights, management has
available four potent devices for diluting voting power and separating control
rights from cash flow rights:
 Preference shares (‘prefs’) have the same voting rights as ordinary
equity, but have a fixed payout with priority over payouts of ordinary
dividends. These shares can be issued at any time without explicit
approval of the shareholders provided that shareholders had given
management the option of issuing prefs at its discretion. Whenever
management feels threatened, it issues prefs in the name of the holder,
who is frequently a continuity foundation (Stichting Continuiteit) friendly
to the firm’s management. Only 25% of the nominal value (determined by
management) of these shares needs to be paid by the holder. Preference
shares, which can be issued on a temporary basis, effectively increase the
voting power of managers. This anti-investor protection (AIP(1)) is used by
66% of the firms in our sample.
 Tradable depository receipts (TDRs) also separate cash flow and
control rights. Under this procedure, the ordinary equity capital is
deposited at an administrative office (Administratie-kantoor), and TDRs
are issued (similar to American Depository Receipts issued on non-US
equity). TDRs generally entitle the holder to cash flow rights, but control
rights reside with the administrative office. This anti-investor protection
(AIP(2)) is used by 32% of the firms in our sample.
 Priority shares (Prioriteits-aandelen) carry special voting rights on
matters such as ‘proposing or preventing the appointment of particular
new members of the management and supervisory boards, approving the
issue of ordinary shares, liquidation of the company or changing the
articles of association’ (Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, p. 67). Priority
shares are issued by management at its own discretion, usually to a
friendly foundation. The holder does not need to pay for these shares. The
issuance of a small number of priority shares is sufficient to curtail the
voting power of extant shareholders. This anti-investor protection (AIP(3))
is used by 24% of the firms in our sample.
The transfer of these three types of shares is opaque, and enhances manage-
ment’s discretion. Shares are usually issued to a continuity foundation or
administrative office that is friendly to management. Typically, these
foundations and offices are not obliged to publish a balance sheet, and hence
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the price of shares is unknown. Consider the case of the well-known company,
Philips Electronics. Philips’ balance sheet reveals that it has placed 300 million
common shares, 500 million preference shares and 10 (!) priority shares with
the (no doubt friendly) continuity foundation Anton Philips. The foundation
has not published a balance sheet, and the transfer price for the preference and
priority shares remains unknown to outsiders.
In the face of these three AIPs, shareholders have little reason to pursue
aggressively their limited tasks granted under the structural regime. The
Dutch annual meeting differs radically from its German and US counterparts,
where, in principle, shareholders have a powerful effect on the course of
events primarily by electing the supervisory board (or board of directors) and
voting on important matters brought before shareholders.
The above AIPs all focus on altering effective voting rights by issuing shares.
In considering voting rights in the Netherlands, it is important to bear in mind
that investor protections and the tasks voted upon at the annual meeting are
directly linked to the applicable organizational regime. Under other organiza-
tional regimes available to Dutch firms, shareholders exercise much more
influence. A fourth AIP is created by the option that allows firms to choose to
be governed according to the rules and regulations of the structural regime
described above, even if they are not required to do so by law.8
Investor protections are enhanced under the other two legal regimes
relevant to public limited liability companies. Firms that meet the criteria for
the structural regime but are majority foreign-owned can follow the mitigated
structural regime (Gewijzigde Structuurregeling). Under this legal regime, the
supervisory board’s responsibilities for appointing and dismissing members of
the management board and drafting the annual financial statement are
transferred to the annual shareholders meeting, enhancing investor protec-
tions. Public limited liability companies that do not meet the criteria for the
structural regime can adopt the common legal regime (Vennootschapsrecht) for
which a supervisory board is optional. If a supervisory board is in place,
appointments are determined at the annual meeting, and its only major
responsibility is to approve major management decisions.9 All other
important decisions, especially the appointment of the management board,
are made at the annual shareholders meeting.10 In sum, investor protections
8. The majority of Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are required to follow
the structural regime because they satisfy all of the following conditions: the firm is a public
limited liability company, subscribed capital exceeds 25 million guilders (approximately
$12.5 million), employment in the Netherlands exceeds 100, and employees are represented
by a works council.
9. A survey of 180 smaller limited liability companies (with 50 to 1,000 employees) – who were
not legally obligated to install a supervisory board but did so voluntarily – revealed that the
main motive for the installation was the need for expert advice (Gelauff and den Broeder,
1997, pp. 44–45).
10. For firms not organized under the structural regime, the responsibilities for hiring and firing
the auditor reside with the annual meeting.
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are substantially enhanced under the mitigated structural and common
regimes, which transfer power from the supervisory board to the annual
meeting. The voluntary adoption of the structural regime can thus be viewed
as another device weakening investor protections because the structural
regime’s supervisory board is largely influenced by management at the
expense of investors. This anti-investor protection (AIP(4)) is used by 25% of
the firms in our sample.
2.3. Institutions
Several institutions – financial intermediaries, works councils and informal
networks – are the third set of key actors in Dutch corporate governance.
Financial intermediaries also hold equity positions and, as discussed above,
shareownership per se may have little impact on controlling managers.
However, their equity stakes are occasionally large, and they are considered
long-term, ‘patient’ investors. Consequently, financial intermediaries fre-
quently obtain seats on the supervisory board.11 Furthermore, banks are
actively involved in extending short-term credit, and thus have a direct and
potentially powerful channel of influence on management (cf. Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, Sec. IV.C). The role of Dutch banks is much greater than in the
United States, where banks are largely prohibited from owning equity and,
until very recently, were small by the standards of continental Europe.12 By
contrast, banks have a long-standing and prominent role on the corporate
landscape in Germany where they hold large positions in both debt and
equity and actively serve on, and frequently chair, supervisory boards.
Employees are represented by a works council (Ondernemings-raad) that is
voluntary but exists at virtually all large firms. The works council has some
influence with and occasional membership on the supervisory board, where
usually one member represents workers’ concerns. The works council has the
same rights as shareholders to propose or reject nominations to the
supervisory board. The position of the works councils bears some resem-
blance to that played by organized labour in the United States, where union
representatives occasionally hold a seat on the board of directors. By contrast,
legal statutes grant German workers much more nominal influence on
11. While bank equity ownership is much greater in Germany than in the Netherlands (14.2%
vs. 0.7%), pension funds and insurance companies own more equity in the Netherlands
than in Germany (13.4% vs. 7.1%) but much less than their US counterparts (24.7%). (Data
are for 1993, and are taken from Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, p. 46.)
12. US banks are generally prohibited from owning equity in corporations (other than similar
financial organizations referred to as congenerics), though equity may be acquired during
loan workouts. Under US law, the principle of equitable subordination provides banks a
strong incentive to avoid equity ownership. In the event of bankruptcy, banks that hold
both equity and debt can have their claims as senior creditors subordinated if the courts
determine that the bank used its influence as equityholder to act inequitably towards other
stakeholders.
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corporate affairs, including between one-third and one-half of the seats on
the supervisory board.13 However, the chair of the German supervisory board
holds the tie-breaking vote, and this position is usually held by a person
(frequently a banker) sympathetic to management’s concerns.
Networks of outside board members are potentially important for control.
These individuals hold positions on the management and supervisory boards
of several companies, and/or they are ‘distinguished experts’ drawn from the
ranks of politicians, civil servants, lawyers, professors and former directors.
With their perspective and experience, these outside board members may
provide valuable advice to firms.
2.4. Summary
Dutch firms are affected by a variety of different corporate control
mechanisms. The extent of investor protections and concentrated ownership
vary across firms, and this variation will be used in the empirical work to
assess the impacts of these corporate control mechanisms on firm perfor-
mance. Financial intermediaries, works councils and informal networks are
additional control mechanisms that may also affect firm performance, but
they will not be analysed further in this study.
3. THE DATASET
We draw on two sources to construct the variables used in the empirical
analysis. Our sample extends from 1992–96, unless otherwise noted.
Financial statement data are obtained from the AMADEUS/REACH database
covering 165 Dutch firms. We focus only on firms involved in manufacturing,
omitting financial and service firms (the latter because they hold a substantial
amount of intangible assets that would distort the performance measure).
The data will be time-averaged to form the cross-section used in the
econometric work. Thus, a balanced panel is highly desirable, and we omit
firms involved in mergers or takeovers. Two firms are excluded: Hunter
Douglas because of erratic data and Royal Dutch Shell because it is registered
in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. These restrictions lead to a
final sample consisting of 93 firms. Variables based on financial statement
data are as follows:
CFA = Cash flow (operating income plus depreciation).
CVCFA = Coefficient of variation of CFA (the standard deviation divided by
the mean) stated as a percentage.
13. German co-determination laws require that, for stock companies with 500 or more
employees, one-third of the seats on the supervisory board must be held by persons elected
by the employees. The fraction increases to one-half for stock companies with 2,000 or more
employees.
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DIVERSITY = The percentage of two-digit industrial activity (classified
according to the 58 BIK codes) in which the firm is involved
outside its core business, measured by revenues.
LEVERAGE = (TA less stockholders’ equity)/TA stated as a percentage.
PROF = Profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses)/TA
stated as a percentage.
SIZE = The natural logarithm of TA.
TA = Total assets less depreciation.
For each of the 93 firms, these variables are averaged from 1992 to 1996.14 The
medians (m), means (m) and standard deviations (s) are presented in Table 1.
Data for anti-investor protections (AIPs) and ownership concentration
(OWNs) for the firm are obtained from the Monitoring Commissie Corporate
Governance (1998). The AIPs and two of the ownership variables enter as
indicator variables. In those rare cases where the defining characteristic (e.g.
issuing preference shares) changes over the sample, the indicator is
determined by the most frequent value of the characteristic. The ownership
stake (OWN(L)) is a continuous variable. The variables are defined as follows:
AIP(1) = 1 if a firm issues preference shares; 0 otherwise.
AIP(2) = 1 if the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository receipts
is equal to or greater than 50%; 0 otherwise.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable
Median (m) Mean (m) Standard deviation (s)
(1) (2) (3)
CFA 75.636 406.331 1,214.386
CVCFA 21.617 28.572 28.587
DIVERSITY 1.700 1.988 2.052
LEVERAGE 62.028 60.495 12.351
OWN(L) 15.000 25.118 21.920
PROF 9.072 9.727 4.775
SIZE 5.972 6.094 1.655
Notes: The entries are the median (m), mean (m) and standard deviation (s) of the indicated
variable averaged from 1992 to 1996 for each of the 93 firms. CFA is cash flow (operating income
plus depreciation); CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the
mean) of CFA; DIVERSITY is the percentage of two-digit industrial activity (classified according to
the 58 BIK codes) in which the firm is involved outside its core business, measured by revenues;
LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders’ equity)/TA; OWN(L) is the ownership stake of the largest
shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity; PROF is profitability
(before-tax profits plus financial expenses)/TA stated as a percentage; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of TA.
14. For those series analysed as ratios, the ratios are computed and then summed over time; that
is, ratioi5St(ai,t/bi,t). All of the ratios are defined so that bi,t is far from zero. This procedure
eliminates the need for price deflators, which are unavailable on a firm-specific basis.
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AIP(3) = 1 if a firm issues priority shares; 0 otherwise.
AIP(4) = 1 if a firm is not required to implement the structural regime, but
does so voluntarily; 0 otherwise.
OWN(L) = Ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated as a percentage
of all outstanding ordinary equity.
OWN(20) = 1 if OWN(L)  0.20; 0 otherwise.
OWN(40) = 1 if OWN(L)  0.40; 0 otherwise.
As shown in the first row of Table 2, the largest shareholder (as measured by
OWN(L)) controls more than 20% of outstanding ordinary equity for over
40% of the firms. Fifteen per cent of the firms are majority owned. Table 2
also includes information on the distribution of the AIPs across categories of
ownership concentration. The first row contains the distribution for all 93
firms. Relative to this benchmark, the different AIPs are used more or less in
similar proportions. As shown in the last line of Table 2, firms that do not use
any AIPs have a large fraction of majority (mostly foreign) ownership.
4. ASSESSING CORPORATE CONTROL MECHANISMS
Corporate control mechanisms are assessed by their impact on economic
performance. Links between good governance and good performance are well




0–5 5–10 10–20 20–40 40–50 50 þ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All firms 93 2 23 28 19 7 14
AIP(1) 61 2 20 20 12 3 4
AIP(2) 30 0 12 8 8 2 0
AIP(3) 22 1 5 8 2 1 5
AIP(4) 23 1 6 5 7 2 2
No AIPs 14 0 1 2 3 2 6
Notes: The entries are the number of firms that use a given anti-investor protection (AIP). Column
1 contains the total number of firms using a given AIP; the remaining entries in a given row
distribute this total across levels of ownership concentration. All of the AIPs are indicator
variables taking a value of 1 for the criteria above and 0 otherwise: AIP(1)51 if a firm issues
preference shares; AIP(2)51 if the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository receipts is
equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)51 if a firm issues priority shares; AIP(4)51 if a firm is not
required to implement the structural regime, but does so voluntarily. See Section 2.2 for further
discussion of the AIPs. Ownership concentration is measured by the ownership stake of the
largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity (OWN(L)).
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established. As argued by Berle and Means, the incentives of managers
controlling the firm differ from those of owners and, in large, publicly held
corporations, most owners/investors have little incentive to expend resources
to ensure that the firm is operated in their interests. Consequently, resources
may be directed to activities that benefit managers rather than firm
performance. Jensen (1986) has emphasized that these agency problems are
likely to become particularly severe when managers have an abundance of
internal resources relative to investment opportunities (i.e. ‘free cash flow’).
The important consequence is that the Berle–Means agency problem may
lead the firm to a suboptimal allocation of resources that compromises
performance.
Investment decisions and hence corporate performance may also be
adversely affected by undue pressure from equity investors for two reasons.
The ‘managerial myopia’ model argues that equity markets may not allocate
capital efficiently because of an absence of stable, dedicated investors with a
long-term interest in the firm’s performance. Formal models of strategic
behaviour establish that, when inside managers know more about the firm’s
operations than outside owners, high hurdle rates that distort investment can
occur because of a premium due to signal jamming, obfuscation or hidden
action. A second concern about powerful shareholders has been raised by
Burkhart et al. (1997). In their model, tight controls by shareholders and the
possibility of termination reduce management’s incentives to engage in non-
contractable personal investment activities that would benefit the firm.
Rather than being ameliorative, empowered investors pressure management
into an undue focus on short-term earnings or an excessive concern about
expropriation at the expense of long-run performance.15
In sum, agency problems adversely affect firms, and corporate control
mechanisms that reduce the impact of these problems should be associated
with better performance. However, as the myopia and termination models
suggest, the link between investor protections and performance is ambig-
uous. While empowered investors may mitigate agency conflicts, myopia and
termination problems may be exacerbated.
A similar ambiguity affects concentrated ownership. Agency problems that
arise from the separation of ownership from control can be checked by
concentrated ownership. With a sufficiently large equity stake in the firm, an
investor has the incentive to invest resources in monitoring and disciplining
managers and thus reducing agency problems. However, concentrated
owners may also use their controlling position to expropriate benefits for
themselves at the expense of small shareholders by, for example, diverting
resources towards other firms in which they have substantial cash flow rights.
Thus, the lower costs of managerial agency problems will be balanced against
15. For discussions of capital allocation systems suffering from short-termism, see de Jong
(1996) for the Netherlands and Porter (1992) for the United States. Bohlin (1997) provides
an excellent survey of formal models of managerial incentives and investment biases.
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the higher agency costs of expropriation. As a result of these conflicting
tendencies, the effects of AIPs and concentrated ownership on firm
performance are ambiguous theoretically. Their ultimate impact is an
empirical matter.
Firm performance is measured by the long-run return on assets computed
as a five-year average. This computation exhausts the time dimension of our
data, and thus our empirical work is based on cross-section analyses. Focusing
on the cross-section dimension of the data is appropriate because the
questions motivating this study focus on long-run relations among profit-
ability and various corporate control mechanisms. Moreover, there is very
little time-series variation in the AIPs and concentrated ownership. This near-
constancy of the corporate control variables suggests that they can be treated
as exogenous regressors over our sample period.16
Finally, financial market data do not provide a good measure of the impact
of corporate control variables on economic performance. In a sense, asset
prices are too good a measure because they capitalize the effects of
favourable/unfavourable corporate governance policies. Hence, the financial
return for a firm serving shareholders’ interests may differ little from the
financial return for a firm with serious and unresolved corporate governance
problems. The Brainard–Tobin q is also not a good measure because it
gravitates towards its equilibrium value of unity, and it will be difficult to
discern the impacts of control variables. Financial market data would be
useful for examining firms switching control mechanisms over time, but such
time-series variation and the associated event studies are not available to us in
this dataset.
5. THE SUBSTITUTION HYPOTHESIS
An important implication of the legal approach to corporate governance is
that concentrated ownership substitutes for poor investor protections. This
relation has been confirmed in the cross-country comparisons reported in La
Porta et al. (LLSV, 1998) and LLS (1999). For our within-country analysis, the
comparable implication is that the AIPs will be positively correlated with
ownership concentration.
Table 3 evaluates this hypothesis in terms of correlation coefficients for
various AIPs and three measures of ownership concentration – the value of
the largest stake (OWN(L)) and indicator variables set to unity if the largest
stake exceeds 20% (OWN(20)) or 40% (OWN(40)). There is scant evidence of
a positive relation.17 Rather, in the case of preference shares or tradable
16. A deeper understanding of exogeneity and corporate control requires us to model the
adoption of corporate control mechanisms, but this important task is not tackled in this
paper.
17. The reported results for AIP(2) may be biased towards a positive correlation. Under AIP(2),
the percentage of shares held by an administrative office may be sufficiently large that the
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depository receipts, the correlations are negative and significant at the 1%
level. Thus, the substitution hypothesis receives little support.
The above statement of the substitution hypothesis may not be sufficiently
sensitive to a key maintained assumption. Who moves first: concentrated
owners or management boards?18 If concentrated owners move first by
taking a dominant equity position, the anticipated correlation may be
reversed. Concentrated owners have an incentive to adopt good corporate
governance practices, and we might expect the AIPs to be eliminated. Under
this scenario, ownership concentration would be negatively correlated with
the AIPs.
As indicated by the analysis of the Dutch corporate governance system in
Section 2, management boards have a great deal of autonomy in adopting
anti-investor protections, and it appears more appropriate to assume that
management boards ‘move first’. Under this assumption, two scenarios might
then unfold. First, a firm shielded from investors by the AIPs might be very
Table 3 Correlation of anti-investor protections and ownership concentra-
tion
AIP(1) AIP(2) AIP(3) AIP(4) OWN(L) OWN(20) OWN(40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AIP(1) 1.000
AIP(2) 0.112 1.000
AIP(3)  0.023 0.222 1.000
AIP(4)  0.005 0.022 0.033 1.000
OWN(L) 0.413 0.291 0.020 0.027 1.000
OWN(20) 0.348 0.167 0.063 0.018 0.794 1.000
OWN(40) 0.367 0.263 0.062 0.071 0.860 0.635 1.000
Notes: The entries are the correlation coefficients between anti-investor protections (AIPs) and
measures of ownership concentration (OWNs). All of the AIPs are indicator variables taking a
value of 1 for the criteria above and 0 otherwise: AIP(1)51 if a firm issues preference shares;
AIP(2)51 if the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater
than 50%; AIP(3)51 if a firm issues priority shares; AIP(4)51 if a firm is not required to
implement the structural regime, but does so voluntarily. Ownership concentration is measured
by the ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding
ordinary equity (OWN(L)) or indicator variables, OWN(20) and OWN(40), taking a value of 1 for
the criteria above and 0 otherwise: OWN(20)51 if OWN(L)  0.20; OWN(40)51 if OWN(L)
 0.40. For a sample of 93 firms, the critical values for the null hypothesis of no correlation are
0.170, 0.201 and 0.261 for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The figures in
bold are those used to evaluate the substitution hypothesis.
firm is also classified as a concentrated owner. In this case, AIP(2) and OWN(L) would be
positively correlated, though such a correlation does not reflect a substitution of governance
mechanisms. This bias does not affect the conclusion to be drawn about the substitution
hypothesis in Table 3.
18. We thank our reviewer for highlighting the importance of these additional assumptions.
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inefficient and hence tempting for an owner to accumulate a large equity
stake so that the potential efficiency gains are captured. This scenario is
consistent with the substitution hypothesis, and would yield a positive
correlation between AIPs and concentrated owners. Second, outside inves-
tors, regardless of the size of their equity stake, may find AIP-shielded firms
undesirable. In this case, potentially large shareholders would avoid (and
existing large shareholders would abandon) the firm, and we would expect a
negative correlation between the AIPs and concentrated ownership.
While simple correlations presented in Table 3 should not be over-
interpreted, it appears that once managers compromise investor protections
with AIPs, large shareholders either avoid or abandon the firm to its
managers. In this initial analysis, concentrated ownership does not appear
to play an ameliorative role in Dutch corporate governance.
6. FIRM PERFORMANCE, INVESTOR PROTECTIONS AND
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
The roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership as corporate
governance mechanisms are assessed in terms of their impact on long-run
profitability. We begin our analysis by establishing a benchmark regression
without any governing mechanisms but containing several conditioning
variables – the coefficient of variation of cash flow (CVCFA), a measure of the
diversity of the firm’s lines of business (DIVERSITY ), leverage (LEVERAGE ), a
measure of firm size (SIZE) and seven industry dummies (not reported).19 All
variables are five-year averages. As shown in column 1 of Table 4, only
LEVERAGE is statistically significant at conventional levels (as well as most of
the industry dummies), an effect that can be interpreted as reflecting the
adverse effects of finance constraints in external capital markets or as a signal
of maturity (since older firms tend to be both more highly levered and less
profitable than younger firms).
The remaining entries in Table 4 examine the impact of three anti-investor
protections that depend on share issuance – preference shares (AIP(1)),
tradable depository receipts (AIP(2)) or priority shares (AIP(3)). We begin by
allowing for the broadest possible scope for the AIPs; if a firm uses any one of
these three AIPs, then a dummy variable is one. As shown in column 2, the
AIPs have a substantial positive impact on firm performance that is both
statistically and economically significant. In the latter regard, firms that have
one or more of these AIPs are 25% more profitable than the complementary
class of firms.20 The remaining entries consider two of the AIPs at time, and
the issuance of priority shares (AIP(3)) has the most consistent positive
impact on profitability.
19. The explicit equation specification is presented in the notes to Tables 4 to 6.
20. Firms without AIP(1), AIP(2) or AIP(3) constitute 19% of the sample.
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Table 5 evaluates the impact of the fourth AIP, the voluntary adoption of
the structural regime (AIP(4)). As shown in column 1, firms that transfer
power away from the annual meeting to the management and supervisory
boards are one-third more profitable than the average sample firm. Columns
Table 4 Profitability regressions: the role of anti-investor protections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Anti-investor protections
AIP(1) or AIP(2) or AIP(3) 2.408
(1.241)
AIP(1) or AIP(2) 0.282
(1.336)
AIP(1) or AIP(3) 2.184
(1.047)
AIP(2) or AIP(3) 2.776
(1.083)
B. Conditioning variables
Constant 18.409 16.598 18.142 17.367 14.678
(3.596) (3.508) (4.347) (3.465) (3.544)
CVCFA  0.835  1.056 0.865  0.961 0.987
(2.104) (2.203) (2.171) (2.163) (2.011)
DIVERSITY 0.171 0.124 0.164 0.104 0.066
(0.283) (0.264) (0.291) (0.266) (0.270)
LEVERAGE 10.609  9.229 10.339  9.285 6.058
(4.408) (4.408) (5.046) (4.393) (4.497)
SIZE 0.337 0.243 0.325 0.247 0.216
(0.321) (0.330) (0.311) (0.325) (0.311)
C. Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.197 0.157 0.196 0.237
RSS 1.540 1.465 1.539 1.466 1.392
Notes: The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:
PROF ¼ b0 þ b1  AIP þ b2  CVCFAþ b3  DIVERSITY
þ b4  LEVERAGEþ b5  SIZEþ
X
j
dj  IDUMj þ e
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses)/TA, the latter defined as
total assets less depreciation; AIP is the indicated combination in Panel A of the anti-investor
protection variables: AIP(1)51 if a firm issues preference shares; AIP(2)51 if the percentage of
shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)51 if a firm
issues priority shares; CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the
mean) of CFA, the latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by TA;
DIVERSITY is the percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved outside
its core business, measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders’ equity)/TA; SIZE is
the natural logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error term. The b’s and
d’s are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic-
consistent. RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 103 .
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2 to 4 interact AIP(4) with each of the three other AIPs. The interactions in
columns 3 and 4 are statistically and economically significant.
The precisely estimated and economically important positive effects of
AIPs on profitability run counter to the legal approach to corporate
Table 5 Profitability regressions: the role of anti-investor protections




AIP(4) and AIP(1) 2.205
(1.527)
AIP(4) and AIP(2) 3.788
(2.113)
AIP(4) and AIP(3) 6.214
(2.861)
B. Conditioning variables
Constant 17.626 18.479 17.850 17.409
(3.309) (3.465) (3.567) (2.992)
CVCFA 0.325 0.625  0.177  1.028
(2.093) (2.092) (2.249) (1.809)
DIVERSITY 0.068 0.162 0.205 0.084
(0.281) (0.271) (0.258) (0.267)
LEVERAGE  10.734 9.794  9.375 10.299
(4.115) (4.466) (4.529) (4.018)
SIZE 0.379 0.257 0.301 0.454
(0.304) (0.304) (0.301) (0.274)
C. Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.186 0.197 0.266
RSS 1.374 1.485 1.464 1.338
Notes: The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:
PROF ¼ b0 þ b1  AIP þ b2  CVCFAþ b3  DIVERSITY
þ b4  LEVERAGEþ b5  SIZEþ
X
j
dj  IDUMj þ e
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses)/TA, the latter defined as
total assets less depreciation; AIP is the indicated combination in Panel A of the anti-investor
protection variables: AIP(1)51 if a firm issues preference shares; AIP(2)51 if the percentage of
shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)51 if a firm
issues priority shares; AIP(4)51 if a firm is not required to implement the structural regime, but
does so voluntarily; CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the
mean) of CFA, the latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by TA;
DIVERSITY is the percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved outside
its core business, measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders’ equity)/TA; SIZE is
the natural logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error term. The b’s and
d’s are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic-
consistent. RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 103 .
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governance. The results in Tables 4 and 5 cast some doubt on the prevailing
view that active stock markets and empowered investors are key to robust
firm performance.
Many papers have argued that ownership concentration will attenuate
agency problems. Given the wide variation in ownership concentration in
the Netherlands (cf. Table 2), this issue can be explored with our data. Table 6
Table 6 Profitability regressions: the role of concentrated ownership











Constant 18.030 19.067 19.159 18.230
(3.333) (3.595) (3.410) (3.380)
CVCFA 0.756 0.597  0.849 0.790
(2.167) (2.198) (2.065) (2.160)
DIVERSITY 0.179 0.181 0.181 0.174
(0.295) (0.292) (0.276) (0.291)
LEVERAGE 10.826  10.615 10.280 10.676
(4.560) (4.545) (4.462) (4.507)
SIZE 0.364 0.306 0.282 0.353
(0.301) (0.297) (0.293) (0.303)
C. Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.152 0.161 0.157
RSS 1.536 1.527 1.530 1.538
Notes: The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:
PROF ¼ b0 þ b1  OWN0 þ b2  CVCFAþ b3  DIVERSITY
þ b4  LEVERAGEþ b5  SIZEþ
X
j
dj  IDUMj þ e
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses)/TA, the latter defined as
total assets less depreciation; OWN0 is the indicated measure of concentrated ownership in Panel
A; CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) of CFA, the
latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by TA; DIVERSITY is the
percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved outside its core business,
measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders’ equity)/TA; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error term. The b’s and d’s are
estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic-consistent.
RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 103 .
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contains several specifications using different measures of ownership
concentration – the ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated as a
percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity (OWN(L)) entered as a linear
term, as both linear and quadratic terms or as indicator variables, OWN(20) or
OWN(40). For the Dutch firms in our sample, there is little systematic relation
between ownership concentration and firm performance, and little support
for the proposition that ownership concentration attenuates agency
problems.
7. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
Recent research in corporate governance has reaffirmed the importance of the
Berle–Means problem of pervasive agency problems, but also has exposed an
important fault line in the Berle–Means paradigm – the assumption of small
and uninformed investors. The emerging legal approach to corporate
governance highlights that the assumption of small investors is not
applicable in most industrialized countries, and emphasizes the importance
of investor protections and ownership concentration as complementary
means for solving governance problems. To date, most of the empirical work
has been cross-country.
This paper uses the interesting institutional features in the Dutch economy
to undertake a within-country analysis. Two key conclusions emerge. First,
the role of investor protections emphasized in the legal approach is not
sustained. Rather, we find that performance is enhanced when the firm is
freed of equity market constraints. Second, ownership concentration does not
have a discernible impact on firm performance. Our results indicate that
concentrated ownership decreases with AIPs, a result consistent with
potentially large shareholders avoiding or abandoning firms with anti-
investor protections. In regression models of profitability, we find no
systematic effect of concentrated ownership, which may reflect the tension
between the lower costs of managerial agency problems versus the higher
agency costs of expropriation by large shareholders.
These conclusions concerning investor protections and concentrated
ownership should be viewed as preliminary. Three important caveats remain.
First, as is well known, results for one country may not be applicable outside
its borders. Second, as shown by Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004), cash
flow and control rights have distinct effects on firm performance, and
exploring these differences is an important item on our research agenda.
Third, a better understanding is needed of the forces leading to the adoption
of AIPs and concentrated ownership. In this study, the adoption was taken as
exogenous because of the stability of the corporate control variables over our
sample. Nonetheless, we would like to have a better appreciation of the forces
at work influencing adoption decisions and the subsequent effects on firm
performance.
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